ByAli Omar Mohamed- Somalia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
“Somalia’s hard-won state-building gains should not be sacrificed in the pursuit of short-term political advantage. Yet that is precisely the risk posed by the Somali Future Council’s latest proposal.”-Ali Omar Mohamed
On 27 July 2026, the Council issued an open letter to the heads of state, defence ministers, and chiefs of defence forces of the countries contributing troops and police to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
Issued ahead of the Kampala Summit, the letter calls on foreign governments to condition their continued security engagement in Somalia on a new domestic political arrangement, including the establishment of an unelected transitional council to replace or exercise authority over the country’s existing federal institutions.
That proposal is not simply misguided. It is constitutionally indefensible, politically dangerous, and unbecoming of anyone who aspires to lead Somalia.
The country formally ended the transitional era in 2012. That achievement was not a procedural technicality. It marked the culmination of years of sacrifice and state-building by the Somali people, supported by African and international partners.
The federal institutions established since then remain imperfect, but they represent the gradual restoration of Somali sovereignty: a recognised federal government, a functioning Parliament, national security institutions, ministries, courts, an electoral commission, and an expanding system of public administration. Their shortcomings should be addressed through reform—not by dismantling the constitutional order whenever political disagreements arise.
The proposed transitional council would not represent reform. It would represent regression, replacing constitutionally established institutions with an appointed body whose membership, mandate, and accountability would rest on political bargaining rather than constitutional legitimacy.
Somalia has travelled this road before. Transitional arrangements repeatedly produced political paralysis, disputed mandates, patronage, and prolonged uncertainty instead of lasting stability.
The first responsibility of every Somali political leader—whether in government or opposition—is to protect and strengthen the Somali state. Political competition is legitimate, but it must never come at the expense of institutions that generations of Somalis struggled to rebuild.
Outsourcing Somali Politics to Foreign Capitals#
The letter asks Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burundi, and Egypt—countries whose soldiers and police officers have sacrificed greatly in support of Somalia—to use their security engagement to influence the country’s internal political settlement.
That is an extraordinary request for self-described Somali patriots to make.
Somalia’s political disagreements are real and deserve serious, inclusive, and peaceful resolution. But they must be settled by Somalis, through Somali institutions and Somali-led dialogue—not by encouraging troop-contributing countries to determine who governs in Mogadishu or how Somalia’s constitutional order should evolve.
Once foreign security partnerships become instruments of domestic political competition, every political faction will be tempted to seek leverage abroad rather than confidence at home. That is not how sovereign states are strengthened. It is how they are weakened.
Even more concerning is the suggestion that AUSSOM’s continued engagement should be linked to partisan political demands. The mission already faces significant financial and operational pressures. Creating additional uncertainty would not strengthen Somalia’s democracy or improve governance. It would only create opportunities for Al-Shabaab and Da’esh to exploit political divisions.
The same principle applies to calls for international financial institutions or development partners to reduce their engagement with Somalia. Support from organisations such as the World Bank helps finance public administration, education, healthcare, infrastructure, economic reform, and essential public services.
Whatever one’s political views, suspending national assistance does not punish a president or a government alone. It affects civil servants, teachers, health workers, businesses, and millions of ordinary Somali citizens.
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Responsible opposition should seek to improve the state, not weaken the institutions upon which citizens depend.
Constitutional Disputes Must Be Resolved Constitutionally#
The Future Council argues that the expiry of the original four-year terms of the President and Parliament created a constitutional vacuum requiring an appointed transitional arrangement.
That is selective constitutionalism.
In March 2026, the Federal Parliament approved constitutional amendments affecting the electoral timetable and the terms of the presidency and legislature. Those amendments remain politically contested, and the opposition is fully entitled to challenge them through peaceful political, parliamentary, and legal means.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between contesting parliamentary decisions and replacing Somalia’s constitutional institutions with an extra-constitutional council lacking a clear legal mandate. The proposed cure would inflict greater damage on Somalia’s constitutional order than the problem it claims to solve.
Nor is Somalia abandoning elections.
For the first time in more than half a century, Somalis are participating in one-person, one-vote elections. Banadir has held historic municipal polls, direct elections have taken place in South West State, and preparations are advancing in both Galmudug and Hirshabelle.
These elections are not without shortcomings. Concerns over inclusivity, security, transparency, and political consensus deserve serious attention. But the answer to disputed elections is better elections—not the abandonment of elections altogether.
Those who oppose the current electoral framework should organise, campaign, present candidates, and seek the confidence of Somali voters.
Democratic disagreements should be resolved at the ballot box and through constitutional institutions, not by returning the country to unelected transitional politics.
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Ali Omar Mohamed is Somalia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and East African Community (EAC) Affairs and a Member of the Federal Parliament of Somalia.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.
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